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Abstract. Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation
of the preferences of multiple agents into a joint decision. If prefer-
ences are binary, i.e., “yes” and “no”, every voting system can be
described by a (monotone) Boolean function χ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
However, its naive encoding needs 2n bits. The subclass of thresh-
old functions, which is sufficient for homogeneous agents, allows
a more succinct representation using n weights and one threshold.
For heterogeneous agents one can represent χ as an intersection of k
threshold functions. Taylor and Zwicker have constructed a sequence
of examples requiring k ≥ 2n2−1 and provided a construction guar-
anteeing k ≤ ( nbn/2c) ∈ 2n−o(n). The magnitude of the worst case
situation was thought to be determined by Elkind et al. in 2008, but
the analysis unfortunately turned out to be wrong. Here we uncover
a relation to coding theory that allows the determination of the min-
imum number k for a subclass of voting systems. As an application,
we give a construction for k ≥ 2n−o(n), i.e., there is no gain from a
representation complexity point of view.
1 Introduction
Consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents whose binary preferences
should be aggregated to a group decision. We assume that voting
is used as aggregation method, i.e., each agent can say either “yes”
or “no”, which we encode by 1 and 0, respectively, to a given pro-
posal. The group decision then is an “accept” (1) or “reject” (0). For-
mally, the used voting system can be modeled as a Boolean function
χ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. By imposing some, quite natural, additional
constraints, we obtain the class of so-called simple games, see Sub-
section 2.2. They are widely applied and very useful tools for under-
standing decision making in political and other contexts. One major
drawback is that they do not admit an obvious succinct represen-
tation. The naive approach, listing the function values of χ, needs
2n bits. Listing so-called minimal winning coalitions, see Subsec-
tion 2.2, also needs 2n−o(n) items in the worst case.
However, the subclass of threshold functions of monotone
Boolean functions or weighted games of simple games, see Sub-
section 2.2, can be represented by just n integer weights wi, for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and an integer threshold/quota q. If a represen-
tation as a threshold function/weighted games is possible, at most
O(n logn) bits are needed for each integer [16]. In the case of ho-
mogeneous agents or players May’s theorem [15], states that we can
choose wi = 1 and 1 ≤ q ≤ n, i.e., a very succinct representa-
tion is possible. In the case of heterogeneous agents or players there
unfortunately are simple games which are not weighted games if
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n ≥ 4. However, Taylor and Zwicker have constructively shown that
each simple game can be represented as the intersection of at most(
n
bn/2c
) ∈ 2n−o(n) weighted games, where the weights are either 0
or 1 and the quotas are 1, see Subsection 2.2. The smallest number
k such that a given simple game Γ can be represented as the inter-
section of k weighted games is called the dimension of Γ. From a
representation complexity point of view we have the following im-
portant questions:
How large can the dimension of a simple game be?
And how can the corresponding weighted games be constructed?
1.1 Related Work
With respect to the first question, Taylor and Zwicker provided a se-
quence of examples requiring at least k ≥ 2n2−1 weighted games
[17]. So, there is a large gap in the knowledge of the magnitude of
the worst case situation, which was thought to be closed by Elkind et
al. in 2008, see [4]. Unfortunately, their analysis is flawed, which we
will demonstrate in Section 3.
Taylor and Zwicker made the observation that although there are
simple games with arbitrarily large dimension, they do not seem to
be used in real–world voting systems. At the time of writing [17] the
authors were only aware of practical voting systems with a dimen-
sion of at least 2. Classical examples of dimension 2 are given by
the Amendment of the Canadian constitution [11] and the US federal
legislative system [18]. The voting systems of the Legislative Coun-
cil of Hong Kong and the Council of the European Union under its
Treaty of Nice rules have a dimension of exactly three, which was
proven in [3, 7], respectively. Quite recently, the dimension of the
voting system of the Council of the European Union under its Treaty
of Lisbon rules has a dimension between 7 and 13 368 [12]. There,
the authors also address the second question by providing heuristic
algorithms based on integer linear programming. Besides that, the
probably first published general approach for the determination of
lower bounds for the dimension of a simple game is presented.
Instead of the intersection, each simple game can also be repre-
sented as a finite union of weighted games, which leads to the notion
of co–dimension, see e.g. [8]. Allowing arbitrary combinations of
unions and intersections results in the concept of a Boolean dimen-
sion, which is introduced and studied in [5]. We remark that the vot-
ing system of the Council of the European Union under Lisbon rules
has a Boolean dimension of exactly three [12]. For the subclass of so-
called complete simple or linear games the dimension was studied in
[9].
1.2 Our Contribution
We show up a link between the dimension of simple games and cod-
ing theory. More precisely, we give a construction of a simple game
from an error correcting code including the determination of the cor-
responding exact dimension. Using results on error correcting codes
we can conclude the existence of simple games whose dimension
asymptotically matches the worst case upper bound 2n−o(n) of Tay-
lor and Zwicker [17], i.e., we close the gap in the literature that was
previously filled by the flawed result of Elkind et al. [4].
We thoroughly discuss the lower bound construction of Taylor and
Zwicker, i.e, we determine the corresponding exact dimension. Cu-
riously enough, just the integer weights 0, 1, and 2 are needed for
the used weighted games. It turns out that Elkind et al. considered an
isomorphic variant of the example of Taylor and Zwicker.
1.3 Outline
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2 we introduce some notation and formally define the
considered concepts in the paper. We also state a well known theo-
retical upper bound for the dimension. Section 3 shows that the ex-
ample given by Elkind et al. [4, Theorem 8] is an isomorphic variant
of the example given by Taylor and Zwicker [17, Theorem 1.7.5].
The games that form the basis for our results are introduced in Sec-
tion 4. Finally, Section 5 contains the proofs of high dimension and
a theorem that forms the main contribution of the paper.
2 Preliminaries
We will start by briefly introducing error correcting codes for readers
not familiar with coding theory, see e.g. [2] for a more comprehen-
sive introduction. In the second part of this section we list the basic
notation and definitions of simple games and their dimension. Here
we refer the interested reader to [17].
2.1 Error Correcting Codes
The Hamming weight hw(x) of a bit vector x ∈ {0, 1}n is the num-
ber of 1-bits in x: hw(x) = |{i : xi = 1}|. The Hamming distance
d(x, y) between two bit vectors x and y is the number of bit positions
where the bits in x and y are different: d(x, y) = |{i : xi 6= yi}|.
Imagine a situation where a 4 bit message has to be transmitted
from a sender to a receiver in a noisy environment where bits are
risking to be flipped during the transmission. By adding extra bits
to the message in a clever way we can recover the original message
if a few bits are flipped. One way of doing this is by using the well
known Hamming[8,4] code where 4 bits are added as illustrated by
the following example:
Example 1. The Hamming[8,4] code is essentially the following set
H of bit vectors:
H = {0000 0000, 0001 1110, 0010 0111, 0011 1001,
0100 1011, 0101 0101, 0110 1100, 0111 0010,
1000 1101, 1001 0011, 1010 1010, 1011 0100,
1100 0110, 1101 1000, 1110 0001, 1111 1111}
The set H contains 16 vectors – one vector for each possible 4 bit
message where the message is the first 4 bits of a vector. The 4 extra
bits make it possible to recover a message when bits are flipped.
The Hamming distance between any two vectors inH is at least 4.
This means that we can recover a message if one bit is flipped by lo-
cating the only vector inH with Hamming distance 1 to the received
message. If two bits are flipped we can only detect that something
bad has happened. This is a so called single error correcting and
double error detecting code — a SECDED code.
Let C8 = H \ {0000 0000, 1111 1111} denote the subset of H
consisting of the 14 bit vectors with Hamming weight 4. The code C8
is referred to as a constant weight code since all the members of C8
has the same Hamming weight. We will refer to C8 several places in
the paper.
2.2 Simple Games and their Dimension
A simple game Γ = (N,W ) is a pair where N = {1, . . . , n}, for
some positive integer n, denotes the set of players or agents andW is
a collection of subsets of N , i.e., W ⊆ 2N , satisfying the following
conditions:
(1) ∅ /∈W ;
(2) N ∈W ;
(3) S ⊆ T ⊆ N and S ∈W implies T ∈W .
A coalition S is a subset of N . If S ∈ W , then it is called winning;
otherwise, it is said to be losing.
The relation to a Boolean function χ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is given
as follows: Let S be the set of coordinates of the input vector x that
are equal to 1, i.e., all players that vote “yes”. The players in N\S
vote “no”. If χ(x) = 1, then S is winning; otherwise, it is losing.
Conditions (1) and (2) and ensure that the group decision does not
contradict the individual preferences in the case of unanimity. The
monotonicity condition (3) models the assumption that an enlarged
set of supporters should not turn the group decision from an accep-
tance into rejection, which is quite reasonable. So a simple game Γ
corresponds to a monotone Boolean function χ with the extra condi-
tions χ(0) = 0 and χ(1) = 1.
Clearly, a simple game Γ is uniquely characterized by either its set
W of winning or its set L of losing coalitions, which may both be as
large as 2n−1 in general. A first reduction is possible: A coalitions S
is called minimal winning if it is winning and all of its proper subsets
are losing. Similarly, a coalition T is called maximal losing if it is los-
ing and all of its proper supersets are winning. The family consisting
of all minimal winning coalitions is denoted by Wm and the family
of all maximal losing coalitions is denoted by LM . Since no mini-
mal winning coalition is a proper subset of another minimal winning
coalition we can apply Sperner’s Lemma, see e.g. [13], to conclude
|Wm| ≤ ( nbn/2c). Similarly, we conclude ∣∣LM ∣∣ ≤ ( nbn/2c).
A simple game Γ = (N,W ) is weighted if there exists a quota
q ∈ R>0 and weights w1, w2, . . . , wn ∈ R≥0 such that S ∈ W
if and only if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. We remark that one can require the
weights and the quota to be non-negative integers [6]. The intersec-
tion (N,W1) ∩ (N,W2) of two simple games is the simple game
(N,W1∩W2). Taylor and Zwicker [17] have shown that any simple
game can be written as the intersection of |LM | weighted games ΓT ,
T ∈ LM , where a coalition S wins in ΓT if S ∩ (N \ T ) 6= ∅. A
weighted representation using weights 0 and 1 is given as follows: A
player in N \ T has weight 1 and all other players have weight 0 in
the game ΓT that has quota 1.
The dimension d of a simple game Γ is the smallest positive inte-
ger such that Γ = ∩di=1Γd where the games Γi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
are weighted. From the previous considerations we conclude
d ≤ |LM | ≤ min
(
2n − |W |,
(
n
bn
2
c
))
. (1)
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To give an intuition of how this upper bound relates to 2n we can use
the the following double inequality that holds for all even positive
integer n [14]:√
2
pin
(
1− 1
4n
)
2n ≤
(
n
n
2
)
≤
√
2
pin
(
1− 2
9n
)
2n. (2)
For all odd positive integer n, we can use the equality
(
n
bn
2
c
)
=(n−1
n−1
2
)
2n
n+1
and obtain the following inequalities:
(
n
bn
2
c
)
≥ n
n+ 1
√
2
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(
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4(n− 1)
)
2n , (3)
(
n
bn
2
c
)
≤ n
n+ 1
√
2
pi(n− 1)
(
1− 2
9(n− 1)
)
2n . (4)
For a bit vector x = x1x2 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n with n bits we let
Sx be the coalition where i ∈ S if and only xi = 1. For a coalition
S ⊆ N we define the bit vector xS accordingly. We use the notation
x¯ and S¯ for complements for bit vectors and sets, respectively.
3 The Example of Taylor and Zwicker
Let us reconsider the construction of a simple game with large di-
mension from [17, Theorem 1.7.5]. To this end, let k be an odd in-
teger, S = {1, . . . , k}, T = {k + 1, . . . , 2k}, and N = S ∪ T . A
coalition X ⊆ N is winning iff either |X| ≥ k + 1 or |X| = k and
|X ∩ T | ≡ 0 (mod 2). Denote the corresponding simple game by
Γk. The minimal winning coalitions of Γk are given by Wm ={
X1∪X2 | X1 ⊆ S,X2 ⊆ T, |X2| ≡ 0 (mod 2), |X1 ∪X2| = k
}
and the maximal losing coalitions of Γk are given by LM ={
X1∪X2 | X1 ⊆ S,X2 ⊆ T, |X2| ≡ 1 (mod 2), |X1 ∪X2| = k
}
.
Since k ≡ 1 (mod 2) we have n ≡ 2 (mod 4) for n = 2k = |N |
and |Wm| = ∣∣LM ∣∣ = 1
2
· ( n
n/2
)
so that the dimension of Γk is at
most 1
2
· ( n
n/2
)
. We remark that Γk is self-dual, so that its dimension
equals its co–dimension.
Theorem 1. For each odd integer k the dimension of Γk is given by
2k−1.
Proof. Let C =
{
xx : x ∈ {0, 1}k,∑ki=1 xi ≡ 0 (mod 2)},
where x denotes the negation of a binary vector and xy denotes the
concatenation of two binary vectors x and y. We have C = LM ,
|C| = 2k−1 and we remark that the minimum Hamming distance of
C is 4 for k > 1.
For the lower bound on the dimension we refer to [17, Theorem
1.7.5].5
For the other direction set Cp ={
x ∈ {0, 1}k : ∑ki=1 xi ≡ 0 (mod 2)}. Since 21−1 = 12 · (21)
we can assume k ≥ 3. We set v = ∩x∈Cpvx, where
vx = [q
x;wx1 , . . . , w
x
2k] with
5 Using the general approach and notation of [12] we can state a quick proof:
For each x, y ∈ C with x 6= y there exist indices 1 ≤ i ≤ k, k + 1 ≤
j ≤ 2k with xi 6= yi, xj 6= yj , and xi 6= xj . Negating xi, xj , yi, and
yj gives two winning vectors x′, y′ with x + y = x′ + y′, i.e., we have
determined a 2-trade, so that the dimension is at least 2k−1.
• wxi =
{
0 : xi = 1,
2 : xi = 0
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, wxj = 1 for all
k + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k, and qx = k − (hw(x)− 1) if x 6= 0;
• wxi = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, wxj = 0 for all k + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k, and
qx = 1 if x = 0.
Let S1 ⊆ N with |S1| ≥ k + 1. For each x ∈ Cp\{0} we have
wx(S1) ≥ hw(x)·0+(k+1−hw(x))·1 = qx. Since |S1 ∩ S| ≥ 1
we additionally have w0(S1) ≥ 1 = q0, so that S1 is winning in v.
Now let S2 be a coalition with |S2| = k and |S2 ∩ S| ≡ 0 (mod 2).
If x is the characteristic vector of S2 ∩ S, then
• wx(S2) = hw(x) · 0 + (k − hw(x)) · 1 = k − hw(x) < qx for
x 6= 0;
• wx(S2) = 0 < 1 = qx for x = 0,
so that S2 is a losing coalition in v. Let S3 be a coalition with
|S3| = k and |S3 ∩ S| ≡ 1 (mod 2). Since |S3 ∩ S| ≥ 1 we
have w0(S3) ≥ 1 = q0. Now let x ∈ Cp\{0} be arbitrary. If
|S3 ∩ S| < hw(x), then we have wx(S3) ≥ (hw(x) − 1) · 0 +
(k − hw(x) + 1) · 1 = qx. If |S3 ∩ S| > hw(x), then there
exists a player i ∈ S3 ∩ S with wxi = 2, so that wx(S3) ≥
hw(x) · 0 + 2 + (k − hw(x)− 1) · 1 = qx. Thus, S3 is winning in
v. Finally, let S4 be a coalition of cardinality k − 1. Since k − 1 is
even, we have the following two cases:
• |S4 ∩ S| ≡ 0 (mod 2), |S4 ∩ T | ≡ 0 (mod 2),
• |S4 ∩ S| ≡ 1 (mod 2), |S4 ∩ T | ≡ 1 (mod 2).
In both cases it is possible to extend S4 to a coalition S5 ∈ LM
by adding a player, so that S4 has to be losing in v. Thus, we have
v = χk and dim(χk) ≤ 2k−1.
Now let us restate the example of [4, Theorem 8]: Let k be an odd
integer and n = 2k, N = {1, . . . , n}. Consider the simple game χ˜k
where all coalitions of cardinality larger than k are winning and all
coalitions of cardinality smaller than k are losing. A coalition X of
cardinality k is winning iff the Hamming distance between X and
{1, . . . , k} is equivalent to 2 modulo 4. In other words, this means
that |X ∩ {1, . . . , k}| is even and |X ∩ {k + 1, . . . , n}| is odd.
Interchanging the first k players with the last k players yields the
example of Taylor and Zwicker. Since Theorem 8 in [4] claims that
the dimension is at least
(
2k
k
)
/2, there is a contradiction to Theo-
rem 1. The flaw6 of the corresponding proof happens where it is say-
ing that if x is the bit vector of a losing coalition and xi 6= xj , then
switching xi and xj results in a bit vector of a winning coalition.
An explicit counter example for n = 6 is given by the characteristic
vectors 100110 and 010110 which both represent losing coalitions.
4 From Error Correcting Codes to Simple Games
In this section, we present a generic recipe for constructing the sim-
ple games forming the basis for our results. Throughout the paper,
we let C ⊆ {0, 1}n denote a set of bit vectors of length n having
positive Hamming weight satisfying this condition:
∀x 6= y ∈ C : |hw(x)− hw(y)| < d(x, y)− 2 (5)
For x ∈ C we define the simple game Γx with players N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} as follows: S wins in Γx if and only if S∩Sx 6= ∅. The
simple game ΓC is now defined by ΓC = ∩x∈CΓx. In other words,
6 We would like to thank Edith Elkind for directly pointing to the position
where the proof breaks down in a private communication.
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a set S is winning if and only if S is a so-called hitting set for the
collection of sets {Sx}x∈C .
The error correcting code C8 from Example 1 is a set of bit vectors
satisfying (5). Another example is the following.
Example 2. Let C be defined as follows for n = 8:
C = {0000 1111, 1100 0000, 0011 1100}
The Hamming weights of the vectors 0000 1111 and 1100 0000 dif-
fer by 2 but their Hamming distance is 6. So (5) holds for these vec-
tors. Coalition {1, 5} is winning in ΓC since it intersects the sets
{5, 6, 7, 8}, {1, 2} and {3, 4, 5, 6}. The bit vector 1000 1000 that
corresponds to the set {1, 5} shares at least one 1-bit with all mem-
bers of C.
4.1 A Dimension Lemma
We now prove a lemma explicitly stating the dimension of our games.
Lemma 1. The dimension of ΓC is |C|.
Proof. The game Γx, x ∈ C, is clearly weighted so the dimension of
ΓC is not higher than |C|.
We now assume that the dimension of ΓC is less than |C|. LetLx =
N \Sx for x ∈ C. The coalition Lx is clearly a losing coalition in ΓC
because Lx ∩ Sx = ∅. Using the pigeonhole principle, we conclude
that there are x, y ∈ C with x 6= y such that Lx and Ly lose in the
same weighted game Γ′ where Γ′ is one of the less than |C| weighted
games whose intersection is ΓC .
By considering basic properties for the Hamming distance and the
Hamming weight we observe that (5) also holds if we replace x and
y with their complements x¯ and y¯. If one of the vectors x¯ or y¯ had
all 1-bits in the d(x¯, y¯) positions where the two vectors differ then
the left hand side of (5) would be d(x¯, y¯) and (5) would not hold.
We therefore conclude that there are players px ∈ Lx \Ly and py ∈
Ly\Lx. We letA andB be the coalitions obtained ifLx andLy swap
these players:A = (Lx\{px})∪{py} andB = (Ly \{py})∪{px}.
We now show that A and B are winning coalitions in ΓC . Without
loss of generality, we consider the coalition A. It is clear that xA and
x share a 1-bit so A wins in Γx. Now let us assume that there is a
member z of C \{x} such thatA loses in Γz . In other words, xA and
z do not share a 1-bit. The vector xA is obtained by flipping a 0-bit
and a 1-bit in the vector x¯:
d(xA, z¯) ≥ d(x¯, z¯)− 2 . (6)
The d(xA, z¯) bits shared by xA and z are all 0 in which case we have
the following:
d(xA, z¯) + hw(xA) + hw(z) = n . (7)
We now use hw(xA) = n− hw(x) together with (7):
d(xA, z¯) = hw(x)− hw(z) . (8)
By using d(x, z) = d(x¯, z¯) and (6) and (8) we obtain the following
inequality:
hw(x)− hw(z) ≥ d(x, z)− 2 . (9)
Since (9) contradicts (5), we conclude that A wins in Γz for any
z ∈ C. Consequently, A also wins in ΓC .
Summing up, we now have two coalitions Lx and Ly that lose in
Γ′ and we can obtain two winning coalitions in ΓC if Lx and Ly
swap two players. These coalitions also win in Γ′ and we obtain a
contradiction since this would mean that the total weight in Γ′ of the
players in Lx and Ly has increased.
It is worth noting that the dimension of the game ΓC is |LM | since
LM = {Lx}x∈C .
If we can construct games with dimension m using our approach
we can also construct games with dimension m′ for every m′ ≤ m
as expressed by the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Let ΓC be a simple game with n players and dimension
m, then there are simple games with n players and dimension m′,
1 ≤ m′ ≤ m.
Proof. Just delete some elements from C.
5 Simple Games with High Dimension
The key question we will deal with in this section is the following:
Can we find families C of bit vectors with high cardinality satisfying
(5)? According to Lemma 1, this would automatically give us games
with high dimension. From the theory on error correcting codes we
know how to construct relatively large families of bit vectors forming
SECDED constant weight codes. If we pick such a code we clearly
have a family C satisfying (5). This observation is the basis for the
proofs in this section. As an example, the code C8 from Example 1
corresponds to a simple game with 8 players and dimension 14.
It is important to stress that constant weight SECDED codes are
not the only families satisfying the generic recipe (5) as illustrated
by Example 2. There are many other families that satisfy (5) but we
will use constant weight SECDED codes to construct our games with
high dimension. In other words, there might be families with larger
cardinalities compared to constant weight SECDED codes satisfying
(5).
Agrell et al. [1] present lower bounds for cardinalities of constant
weight SECDED codes. These lower bounds can be directly trans-
lated to lower bounds for dimensions for simple games if we use
Lemma 1. This allows us to set up Table 1 that compares the di-
mensions of the games produced using composition of unanimity
games [9] with the dimensions of the games based on our approach
and the lower bounds from [1]. The first column displays n. The sec-
ond column presents the dimensions of the games from [9] and [17].
The third column contains the dimensions of the games produced us-
ing our approach and constant weight SECDED codes. Finally, the
last column shows the, slightly improved, upper bound
(
n
bn/2c
)− 1.7
As an example, we can see that our approach leads to a simple game
with dimension 14 for n = 8 – the game ΓC8 .
We are now ready to consider all other values of n. Initially, we
consider the case where n is a power of 2. The following lemma
generalizes the example described earlier with |C8| = 14 for n = 8
to n = 2m for m ≥ 3.
Lemma 2. Let n = 2m where m is an integer, m ≥ 3. There is a
set of bit vectors C ⊆ {0, 1}n satisfying (5) with
|C| = 2
n
(
1
2
(
n
n
2
)
+ (n− 1)
(
n
2
− 1
n
4
))
. (10)
Proof. Let t = 2m − 1. The enumerator polynomial for an error
correcting code is a polynomial where the i’th coefficient, ai, is the
number of bit vectors of Hamming weight i. According to [19], the
7 Sperner’s Theorem also classifies the cases where his bound is tight. Since
all of the corresponding simple games are indeed weighted, the previous
upper bound can be reduced by 1.
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Table 1: A comparison of the dimensions of the games produced
using composition of unanimity games and the dimensions of the
games based on our approach.
n Unanimity games Our approach
( n
bn/2c
)− 1
6 4 4 19
7 4 7 34
8 8 14 69
9 9 18 125
10 16 36 251
11 18 66 461
12 32 132 923
13 36 166 1715
14 64 325 3431
15 81 585 6434
16 128 1170 12869
17 162 1770 24309
18 256 3540 48619
19 324 6726 92377
20 512 13452 184755
enumerator polynomial for the well known Hamming[t,t−m] code
that contains bit vectors of length t is:
A(x) =
(1 + x)t + t(1− x)(1− x2)(t−1)/2
t+ 1
.
Let i = t−1
2
(i = 2m−1 − 1 is odd and i+ 1 is even) :
ai =
1
t+ 1
((
t
i
)
+ t(−1) i+12
(
i
i−1
2
))
ai+1 =
1
t+ 1
((
t
i+ 1
)
+ t(−1) i+12
(
i
i+1
2
))
= ai
The extended code Hamming[t + 1,t −m] is a SECDED code. We
can now let C be the subset of the extended code containing the bit
vectors with Hamming weight n
2
. This is a constant weight SECDED
code satisfying (5).
Set n = t+1 = 2i+2. The number of bit vectors in the extended
code with Hamming weight n
2
= i+ 1 is ai + ai+1 = 2ai+1:
2ai+1 =
2
n
((
n− 1
n
2
)
+ (n− 1)(−1)n4
(
n
2
− 1
n
4
))
For n ≥ 8 we have:
2ai+1 =
2
n
((
n− 1
n
2
)
+ (n− 1)
(
n
2
− 1
n
4
))
We now use(
n
n
2
)
=
(
n− 1
n
2
)
+
(
n− 1
n
2
− 1
)
= 2
(
n− 1
n
2
)
to obtain
2ai+1 =
2
n
(
1
2
(
n
n
2
)
+ (n− 1)
(
n
2
− 1
n
4
))
.
We now state our main theorem where we also consider values of
n that are not powers of 2.
Theorem 2. For any positive integer n there is a simple game with
n players and dimension d satisfying:
d ≥ 1
n
(
n
bn
2
c
)
. (11)
If n = 2m for an integer m ≥ 3 then there is a simple game with n
players and dimension d such that
d =
1
n
(
n
n
2
)
+
2(n− 1)
n
(
n
2
− 1
n
4
)
. (12)
Proof. Graham and Sloane [10] have shown that there is constant
weight SECDED code with Hamming weight w with cardinality at
least 1
n
(
n
w
)
for any w. For w = bn
2
c we get (11) by using Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 give us (12).
It follows from (2) and (3) that the lower bound presented in The-
orem 2 is 2n−o(n). Our games are easily seen to be within a factor n
from the upper bound from (1). Finally, we point out that the proof
of the lower bound in [10] is constructive.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a link from coding theory to the dimension of
simple games. We are not aware of any other connection between
coding theory and simple games. While it seems a rather tough prob-
lem to determine the exact dimension of a simple game, in Lemma 1
we have provided an exact formula for those simple games arising
from error correcting codes. Via this connection any improvement
on lower bounds of constant weight codes improves the stated lower
bounds for the worst case dimensions of simple games. For the other
direction it would be interesting to know whether unrestricted codes
satisfying inequality (5) have some application in coding theory. Till
now it is even unclear, at least for us, if those codes can be strictly
larger than constant weight codes. From our point of view this con-
nection should be explored in more detail.
The asymptotic magnitude of the worst case examples with re-
spect to the dimension of simple games is determined, which closes
a gap in the literature and uncovers a flaw in a previous attempt. The
bad news are that from a representation complexity point of view the
usage of intersections of weighted games can not be a solution for
all cases. From a practical point of view one may nevertheless ask
whether the set of weighted games with small dimension are not too
far apart from the set of simple games, so that there is no reason to
use high-dimensional simple games in reality.
From a mathematical point of view it would be interesting to de-
termine the exact values of the worst case examples.
The construction of the representing weighted games is still
widely open and deserves further attention.
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